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THE MISAPPROPRIATION DOCTRINE: A
SEARCH FOR LITERARY
TITLE PROTECTION*
Since the 1964 United States Supreme Court's decisions in

Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.1 and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite

Lighting, Inc., 2 state and lower federal courts have been vacillating
over the vitality of the misappropriation doctrine of unfair competition.8 This comment will discuss the response by California
courts and federal courts in California to the Sears and Compco
decisions. In particular, an examination will be made of the ramifications of a recent California case, Tomlin v. Walt Disney Productions,' in considering the vitality of the misappropriation doctrine. The author will also examine the status of protection for such
literary property as titles, the subject at issue in Tomlin, and show
how the unfair appropriation of titles can be effectively deterred
within the dictates of the Sears and Compco decisions.
UNFAIR COMPETITION:

ITS ORIGIN AND

GROWTH

Palming off: Unfair Use of a Competitor's Reputation

Unfair competition originated as a separately recognized tort
when courts first realized the need to provide protection for business when basic unfairness arose.5 Originally, unfair competition
was a valid claim only when palming off was proven.' Palming
off is the sale by a party of his own product while taking advantage
of the reputation or goodwill of a competitor by advertising or
misrepresenting his product as that of his competitors.7 While free
competition was encouraged, conduct that violated existing standards of commercial morality, e.g., palming off, was punished.'
Misappropriation: Unfair Use of a Competitor's Product

The palming off theory restricted recovery to certain narrowly
defined factual situations and due to the exigencies of business and
* This paper will be entered in the 1972 Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition
sponsored by the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers.
1 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
2 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
8 The source of this doctrine lies in the landmark case of International News
Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
4 18 Cal. App. 3d 226, 96 Cal. Rptr. 118 (1971).

5 S. CHSTERFILD OPPFNHEIM, UNFAIR TRADE PRAcTicEs, 4 (2d ed. 1965).
0 Hanover Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916).

7 International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
8 OPPENHEIM[, supra note 5, at 44.
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technological growth palming off was not a satisfactory remedy.
In the landmark case of International News Service v. Associated
Press,9 the United States Supreme Court recognized a need to
extend common law protection to cases of misappropriation."
Misappropriation is an attempt by a second party to take advantage of the product itself; whereas in palming off, the second
party takes advantage of the reputation or goodwill of a competitor. "
In the INS case International News Service copied news from
Associated Press bulletin boards and early editions. International
News Service then wired its newly acquired stories to certain West
Coast papers, thereby getting news on the street at the same time

or in advance of Associated Press. The Court in INS recognized that
Associated Press had made a substantial investment in their news
stories and enjoined International News Service from copying prior
12

to publication by Associated Press and their realization of a profit.

Immediately after INS most courts accepted the INS rationale and the misappropriation doctrine. For example, the misappropriation doctrine was applied to the appropriation of phonograph

recordings,' 8 professional athletics," and in areas of literary property where copyright protection was not available.1 5 As a result of
INS, the misappropriation doctrine provided a flexible remedy to
9 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
10 Sell, The Doctrine of MisappropriationIn Unfair Competition-The Associated
Press Doctrine After Forty Years, 11 VANDERBmLT L. REV. 483 (1950). The author
asserts that there is no real indication that the legislature could handle the problem.
Any effort at defining unfair competition and misappropriation is useless since possibilities in this area are limited only by human ingenuity and vary with each new
generation. The unique value of the misappropriation doctrine is its flexibility and
applicability to changing problems of commerce.
11 248 U.S. at 240.
12 248 U.S. at 240-41. Mr. Justice Brandeis in dissenting considered the public
need for free access to ideas and knowledge and was concerned with granting a property right with the privilege of exclusive control to such areas. However, the majority
said: "[Diefendant, by its very act, admits that it is taking material that has been
acquired by complainant as the result of organization and the expenditure of labor,
skill, and money,... and that defendant in appropriating it and selling it as its own is
endeavoring to reap where it has not sown . . ." Id. at 239.
13 Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 194 A. 631 (1937).
JA Pittsburgh Athletic Club v. KQV Broadcasting Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (W.D.
Pa. 1938).
15 Note, Developments in the Law, Competitive Torts, 77 HARv. L. Rxv. 888, 932
(1964). "Misappropriation, which shares with passing off the general label of unfair
competition, is one of several legal doctrines concerning protection of intangibles of
potential commercial value. These intangibles include ideas, information, formulas, designs and artistic creations, fame, goodwill, and performance of talent. . . . Misappropriation consists not in taking the physical object but in copying or drawing upon
the conception or underlying intangible value for the use of the appropriator."
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protect a party from predatory business practices without waiting
for legislative reaction. 16
Sears and Compco: Reign of Obfuscation
In 1964 the Supreme Court in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel
Co., 17 and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 8 held that
copying the designs for a pole lamp and a fluorescent lighting fixture could not be prevented by Illinois State unfair competition laws
where federal patent protection was unavailable. The Court said that
a state cannot extend the life of a patent on an article or give a
patent to an article which lacks the level of invention required for
federal patents. 19
If interpreted literally, the Supreme Court's decisions in the
Sears and Compco cases established a per se rule against any state
method of protection which has an effect of granting a monopoly.20
Since these decisions, state courts and lower federal courts have been
hopelessly bewildered as to the effect of Sears and Compco on the
misappropriation doctrine as stated in INS.2 This confusion stems
from the fact that the Supreme Court did not discuss the vitality of
INS and whether application of the misappropriation doctrine is
still permissible.2 2
CALIFORNIA TREATMENT OF THE MISAPPROPRIATION
THEORY AFTER Sears AND Compco

Immediately following Sears and Compco a federal court in
California, in Jerrold Stephens Co. v. Alladin Plastics, Inc.,2" rigorSell, supra note 10, at 498.
17 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
18 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
19 Id. at 239. Justice Harlan (concurring) argued that the states should have
leeway to contend with predatory business practices where copying amounted to
palming off.
20 Goldstein, Federal System Ordering of the Copyright Interest, 69 COLUm. L.
REV. 49, 69 (1969). The author explains that application of the INS rationale requires
that each case be examined on its facts to determine the effect on the competitionmonopoly balance. However, Sears and Compco if interpreted literally posit a rigid
policy designed to shift the balance to free competition. Id. at 64.
21 There has been a split within the courts with regard to the vitality of the misappropriation doctrine. For approval of continued use see Grove Press, Inc. v. Collectors Publication, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 603 (C.D. Cal. 1967) ; KMLA Broadcast Corp.
v. Twentieth Century Cig. Vend. Corp., 264 F. Supp. 35 (C.D. Cal. 1967); Pottstown
Daily News Pub. Co. v. Pottstown Broadcasting Co., 247 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Pa.
1965). Contra, Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. De Costa, 377 F.2d 315 (1st
Cir. 1967); Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., 335 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1964).
22 Goldstein, supra note 20, at 72, where the author states that courts read Sears
and Compco as prohibiting state injunction against copying but not against misappropriation.
28 229 F. Supp. 536 (S.D. Cal. 1964).
16
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ously applied Sears and Compco. In Stephens the plaintiff depended
upon the federal patent law for protection of his bucket-shaped
plastic seats. The court said that where a party depends on federal
patent law he cannot recover under state common law or a state
statutory claim of unfair competition. 4
However, the misappropriation theory was held to be still valid
in Grove Press, Inc. v. Collectors Publication, Inc.,25 where Sears
and Compco were limited to their facts. The plaintiff, Grove Press,
published a version of a book no longer protected under the federal
copyright law with some basic grammatical changes. The book, My
Secret Life, the story of an anonymous gentleman, was originally
printed in the late 19th century. The changes in grammar from
the original were considered trivial, and copyright protection was not
applicable since the required level of originality was lacking. The
defendant, Collectors Publication, Inc., made a photographic copy
of the book and reproduced it using an offset lithographic process.
The court, in implementing the INS rationale and the misappropriation doctrine, said that, in view of Grove Press's expenditure of
substantial sums in setting type and engraving plates, it would constitute unfair competition for the defendants to appropriate the
value and benefit of such expenditure to themselves.2 6 The court in
Grove Press issued a temporary injunction, stating that wrongful
appropriation of the property of another is unfair competition and
redressable in spite of the holdings in Sears and Compco."
Throughout the Sears and Compco decisions, the Court juxtaposed its discussion of patents with a reference to copyrights. The
Grove Press decision illustrates the use of the misappropriation
theory where copyright protection is unavailable. 2 s Although the
Court in Compco said that the states cannot invoke methods to prohibit copying,29 the court in Grove Press distinguished their case, not
on the rationale that copying was prohibited, but that the means
used was unlawful.8 0 The court reasoned that to allow copying by
photography and the offset lithographic process would make plaintiff's expenditures, as compared with the defendant's, an unfair
burden. Consequently, an equitable result was achieved despite the
limitations of the Sears and Compco cases.
State protection from copying would appear to violate the per se
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

Id. at 539.
264 F. Supp. 603 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
264 F. Supp. at 606-7.
Id. at 606.
OPPaNaamn, supra note 5, at 208-9.
376 U.S. 234, 237-38 (1964).
264 F. Supp. 603, 607 (1967).
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rule of Sears and Compco against any state method of extending
monopoly-type protection. 8 1 However, the court in Grove Press implemented the misappropriation doctrine just as the Supreme Court
did in INS, where plaintiff could not recover under federal copyright
law. One writer suggests that the fact that the federal copyright law
is not as comprehensive as the patent law indicates that the preemption principles expounded in Sears and Compco were not in82
tended to resolve problems peculiar to the copyright law. Whether
or not this suggestion is valid, the misappropriation doctrine has been
used to complement copyright protection.
The misappropriation doctrine was also upheld in Tape Industries Association of America v. Younger,88 where the plaintiff
made tapes of phonograph recording discs and sold them as his own
product. Interestingly, the court in Tape Industries applied the INS
4
rationale while upholding the California "tape piracy" statute.
The statute, making it an offense to steal or appropriate another's
saleable product, was held not to contravene federal policies as
enunciated in Sears and Compco.88
Thus, both Grove Press and Tape Industries granted limited
protection against appropriation or the use of one's product by another for profit. Presumably, both would contravene the Sears and
Compco dictates if the latter cases were rigorously applied. However,
the grant of monopoly protection in Grove Press and Tape Industries
is de minimis; the plaintiff has an action against only the offending
party for unfair means of appropriation and the public at large is still
free to copy. The effect of the Sears and Compco decisions is to
make it clear that free competition is the paragon of business, and
the grant of a monopoly with exclusive control is contrary to the
public good, unless allowed by federal law. In Grove Press and Tape
Industries the spirit of Sears and Compco to deny extended monopoly protection is clearly followed; only limited protection is
granted to prevent competitors from appropriating a product under
circumstances where they will gain an unfair advantage in the
business market.
TITLE PIRACY:

AN INSIDIOUS PRACTICE

86

Although the Sears and Compco decisions were concerned with
81 See text accompanying notes 17-22, supra.
82 Kestenbaum, The Sears and Compco Cases: A Federal Right to Compete By
Copying, 51 A.B.A.J. 935, 938 (1965).
33 316 F. Supp. 340 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
84 CAL. PEN. CODE § 653(h) (West 1968).
35 Tape Industries Association of America v. Younger, 316 F. Supp. at 351.
86 The undesirability of literary title piracy was discussed at length in Johnston
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invalid design patents, the dictates of those decisions have been extended to the area of literary titles. In Tomlin v. Walt Disney Productions, 7 the composer of a song alleged unfair appropriation of
his title. The composer primarily sought an injunction to prevent
the use of his title, "The Love Bug Will Bite You (If You Don't
Watch Out)," by Walt Disney Productions in their movie, The Love
Bug.38 Tomlin contended that Walt Disney Productions had appropriated Tomlin's popular title without paying for this privilege."
The court said, however, that recovery for title misappropriation
requires that the title in question have a secondary meaning.4 ° Secondary meaning is a subsequent significance in addition to the
original meaning of a word group which becomes its primary significance to the public. 4 ' The concept of secondary meaning has been
extended to areas of literary property, such as titles, where the
name is recognized as being distinctive.4 2 The court in Tomlin
v. 20th Century-Fox Film Corp., 82 Cal. App. 2d 796, 817, 187 P.2d 474, 487 (1947).
The court said: "The title . . .was produced by shrewd calculation. It is an original
combination, a catchy phrase. It had sales appeal. Much energy, time and money
were spent in popularizing it. A thing of such great value should not only be protected but should be subject to transfer for use. There is no valid reason why it
should not be held that a transferable property right exists in use of a title of a
book, such as this, for motion picture and other ends."
37 18 Cal. App. 3d 226, 96 Cal. Rptr. 118 (1971). See also Klein, Is Unauthorized Use of Titles of Artistic Works In Unrelated Fields Actionable Piracy?, 28
BROOKLYN L. REv. 59, 66-67 (1962).
38 As explained in Tomlin: "Persons are often described as having been bitten by
'The Golf Bug,' 'The Acting Bug,' 'The Gambling Bug,' 'The Travel Bug,' as well as
'The Love Bug.'" Tomlin v. Walt Disney Productions, 18 Cal. App. 3d 226, 229 n.1,
96 Cal. Rptr. 118, 119 n.1 (1971).
39 Id. at 229, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 119.
40 Id. at 230, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 120.
41 See also OPPENHEIM, supra note 5, at 67. "The phrase 'secondary meaning,' as
thus used does not mean a subordinate or rare significance. It means rather a subsequent significance added to the previous meaning of the designation and becoming in
the market its usual and primary significance." For a typical state court interpretation of this concept see Hemingway v. Film Alliance, 174 Misc. 725, 726, 21 N.Y.S.2d
827, 828 (1940). The court held that: "[W]here a play has attained such popularity
that its title has acquired a secondary meaning, one associated with or suggestive of
the play, a rival producer will not be permitted to use or simulate the title, or any
part of it, in such manner as to deceive or mislead the theatre-going public into
believing that the latter production is a motion picture version of the earlier play."
42 See for example NiMs, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS,
§ 37 at 154 (4th ed. 1947), quoted in Gordon v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 269 Cal.
App. 2d 31, 35, 74 Cal. Rptr. 499, 502, which provides a summary of the secondary
meaning rule: "Primarily, it would seem that one might appropriate to himself for
his goods any word or phrase that he chose; but this is not so, because the broader
public right prevails, and one may not appropriate to h's own exclusve use a word
which already belongs to the public. . . . [The theory of secondary meaning] contemplates that a word or phrase originally, and in that sense primarily, incapable of exclusive appropriation with reference to an article on the market, because geographically
or otherwise descriptive, might nevertheless have been used so long and so exclusively
by one producer with reference to his article that, in that trade and to that branch
of the purchasing public, the word or phrase had come to mean that the article was
his product; in other words, had come to be, to them, his trademark."
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denied relief, reasoning that the song title had not achieved the
necessary recognition by the public to acquire a secondary mean43
ing.

Significantly, the court in Tomlin stated that the misappropriation theory as a method of protection for literary titles is no
longer a proper means of relief, losing its vitality in the Sears and
Compco decisions.44 The Tomlin decision was undoubtedly correct on
its facts. However, the court's dictum which denounced the misappropriation doctrine as a viable theory of protection is in this
author's opinion both unfortunate and incorrect. Grove Press and
Tape Industries suggest but two factual situations where the misappropriation doctrine can be applied without offense to the strict
limitations on copyright protection announced in Sears and Compco.
Protection of titles by the misappropriation doctrine may frequently
be the singular means of relief and it should be applied to prevent
inequitable business practices.
Prior to Tomlin an action for unfair appropriation of a title
could only be maintained if the title had acquired a secondary meaning.

Relief under this theory is necessary since titles are not con44

sidered a writing and are not protected by federal copyright law.46
Despite federal preemption in some areas, a concept reaffirmed in
Sears and Compco, states can grant common law copyright protection of an author's right to the first publication of his work.47 One
writer observes that state courts and lower federal courts have often
given protection through the misappropriation-common law copyright nexus as a facile means to escape the broad dictates of Sears
and Compco.48 Examples of this method of circumventing Sears and
Compco are the Grove Press and Tape Industries decisions.49 In
these cases the misappropriation doctrine was applied despite the
the fact that the products involved did not qualify for federal statutory copyright protection.
18 Cal. App. 3d 226, 237-38, 96 Cal. Rptr. 118, 120 (1971).
Id. at 230, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 122.
45 Id. at 230, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 120.
46 See 17 U.S.C. § 4 (1959). "The works for which copyright may be secured
under this title shall include all the writings of an author." For a statement of the
rule that titles are not copyrightable see Harms, Inc. v. Tops Music Enterprises, Inc.,
160 F. Supp. 77, 81 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
47 17 U.S.C. § 2 (1959). "Nothing in this title shall be construed to annul or
limit the right of the author or proprietor of an unpublished work, at common law or
in equity, to prevent the copying, publication, or use of such unpublished work without his consent, and to obtain damages therefor."
48

44

48

p. Goldstein, Federal System Ordering of the Copyright Interest, 69 CoLUMBIA

L. REV. 49, 72 (1969).
49

See text accompanying notes 25-35, supra.
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5
In Jackson v. Universal InternationalPictures," decided before
Tomlin, the court held that the author of a play, Slightly Scandalous,
could successfully recover for the appropriation of his title which
had a secondary meaning. 5 One writer criticizing Jackson urged
automatic protection for distinctive non-descriptive titles stating
that only a title which is the natural and necessary description of
2
the work needs a secondary meaning to receive protection. One
way to grant automatic protection for the distinctive non-descriptive
title would be to provide for registration of literary titles through
an amendment to the Trade Mark Act; this would provide immediate protection for non-descriptive titles and would still allow
authors with a descriptive title to receive protection by proving
secondary meaning. Traditionally, a trade-mark identifies goods
used by a businessman to distinguish them from goods sold by
others." Arguably, the title in Jackson is designed to be distinctive
4
and use by another should not be allowed.
5
In Johnston v. 20th Century-Fox Film Corp.,5 the court found
secondary meaning in the title of a book, Queen of the Flat Tops.
The court stated that this title, which was used to describe an aircraft carrier, was non-descriptive, arbitrary and fanciful; the use
of such a title by another for radio, motion pictures, dramatic or
56
television productions would unfairly compete with the author.
Furthermore, the court stated that secondary meaning is not neces57
sary to obtain protection of a title which is distinctive.
50 36 Cal. 2d 116, 222 P.2d 433 (1950).
51 36 Cal. 2d at 122, 222 P.2d 433, 436 (1950). See also Hemingway v. Film
Alliance, 174 Misc. 725, 21 N.Y.S.2d 827, 829 (1940). "The likelihood of deception is
[A] vast field of words and phrases is open to a producer who wishes to
enough ....
seek a title to distinguish his play or photoplay from that of another. . . . It will affect not only the moving picture rights in their play, but the further presentation of
the play itself."
52 3 R. CALL-AN, LAW OF UNleAm COMPETITION, 890 n.40 (3rd. ed. 1969).
53 OPPENHEIM, supra note 5, at 66.
54 The requirement that a title achieve a special significance with the public is
explained in Netterville, Piracy and Privilege in Literary Titles, 32 S. CAL. L. REV.
101, 113 (1959) where the author states: "Since the title of a literary work is the
generic, common, and only designation by which the public knows the work, the title
can never qualify as a technical trademark." Contra CALLMAN, supra, note 52, 888-90
where the author explains that a title which is the natural and necessary description
of the work is not freely selected since the nature of the work dictates the title;
however, a title which is non-descriptive, freely selected and sharply distinguishes the
work from all others does not need a secondary meaning. Literary title piracy has
been rampant of late and should not be encouraged.
55 82 Cal. App. 2d 796, 187 P.2d 474 (1947).
56 Id. at 809, 817, 187 P.2d at 482, 487.
57 Contra Colvig v. KSFO, 224 Cal. App. 357, 369, 36 Cal. Rptr. 701, 708 (1964).
"[S]ince titles to literary works are usually descriptive and their protection dependent
upon secondary meaning, the general principles of the law of unfair competition
apply."
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The dictum in Johnston to grant exclusive protection to titles
that are non-descriptive, without proof of secondary meaning, was
critized in Gordon v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc.58 As the court in
Gordon pointed out, the suggestion to grant trade-mark protection
for literary titles is contrary to established law. However, by extending registration under the Trade Mark Act to non-descriptive
titles, federal protection would be provided without conflicting with
the Sears and Compco decisions. Thus, an effective means of protecting an original idea of commercial value would be provided.
In Gordon the author of a novel, The FBI Story, alleged unfair
appropriation of his title. However, the court, to avoid any possible
conflict with Sears and Compco, required proof of palming off.59
Thus, Gordon had to show that the defendant used his title with an
intent to deceive the public. This proved to be an insurmountable
burden since the defendant's title had possibly been taken from a
nonfiction book entitled, The FBI Story, A Report to the People.
In Gordon, the plaintiff had a contract option with Gramercy
Pictures, Inc., for the use of his title.6" To digress for a moment,
suppose Gordon had been able to prove that the defendant had
unfairly appropriated his title. This would create an inequitable situation that calls for the application of the misappropriation doctrine.
The rationale for granting relief would be that, after much time and
expense in popularizing his title, Gordon was about to realize a
profit from the title he had developed by contracting with another
for its use.6 1 Where a party has popularized a title and made it a
valuable commodity, another party should not be allowed to nullify
the first's efforts to realize a profit. 2 Just as the Court in INS
enjoined International News Service from interference with Associated Press at the crucial period when profit was to be realized,
a court should enjoin a defendant who misappropriates a title.
To deter title piracy, courts should allow protection of a title
against competitors in related fields. 3 Implementing the INS rationale, a limited right to use the literary title would be granted until
its commercial value to the owner ceased. 4 Sears and Compco stand
58 269 Cal. App. 2d 31, 35 n.1, 74 Cal. Rptr. 499, 501 n.1 (1969).
59 In Sears the court stated, "Obviously a State could not, consistently with the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, extend the life of a patent beyond its expiration date or give a patent on an article which lacked the level of invention required
for federal patents." Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964).
60 269 Cal. App. 2d 31, 34, 74 Cal. Rptr. 499, 500-01 (1969).
61 See text accompanying notes 11-15, supra.
62 International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239 (1918).
63 Hemingway v. Film Alliance, 174 Misc. 725, 21 N.Y.S.2d 827, 829 (Sup. Ct.
1940), see also note 51, supra.
64 International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 245 (1918).
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against any perpetual monopoly. However, to originators of a title
associated with the work it identifies, only a limited right against
competitors would be given. This grant of limited protection to
realize commercial value might necessitate a change in the traditional requirement by the courts that literary titles have a secondary
meaning. One approach was suggested by a court that granted pro5
tection under the misappropriation doctrineY This court granted
relief on the basis of public familiarity, an arguably subjective
66
standard somewhat less demanding than secondary meaning. The
test of familiarity would be an issue of fact to be decided in each
case.
A final consideration of the above suggestions indicates that
a grant of limited protection to literary titles, against competitors in
related fields, would discourage title piracy, promote free competition by rewarding individual ingenuity, and alleviate unfair appropriation for commercial gain. The court in Tomlin v. Walt Disney
Productions,67 said that the theory of misappropriation for literary
titles is no longer valid. 8 However, such a dogmatic statement
fails to take into account the varied problems in business, the need
for courts to have a flexible means to adopt changes, and the need
for an effective remedy to provide relief when inequities arise. The
misappropriation doctrine is such a flexible tool, as illustrated in
the Grove Press and Tape Industries cases. Consequently, the misappropriation doctrine should be implemented, where appropriate,
in the area of literary titles in order to allow the originator to realize
commercial gain on a title that he has popularized and made valuable.
FAIRNESS: A TREND IN TRADE NAMES THAT SHOULD
APPLY TO TITLES

Continued vitality of the misappropriation doctrine stands as
mute testimony that dogmatic application of the Sears and Compco
decisions is inimical to the law of unfair competition. The desire of
the courts to encourage fairness in other areas of business can be
illustrated in the area of trade name protection. An example of this
69
trend is Ball v. American Trial Lawyers Association, where two
associations of attorneys contested the future use of defendant's
trade name. Plaintiff, the American College of Trial Lawyers, is
65 Flexitized, Inc. v. National Flexitized Corp., 335 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 380 U.S. 913 (1964).
66 Id. at 781.
67 18 Cal. App. 3d 226, 96 Cal. Rptr. 118 (1971).
68 Id. at 230, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 122.
69 14 Cal. App. 3d 289, 92 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1971).
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an unincorporated association whose membership is highly selective .70 Defendant, American Trial Lawyers Association, is a large
national association originally composed of attorneys who practiced
in the workmen's compensation field. On August 2, 1964, defendant
adopted its present name, American Trial Lawyers Association,
despite a discussion with the plaintiff concerning the possibility of
confusion surrounding the two names. On appeal the court granted
a final injunction against the use of the name "American Trial Lawyers Association" by defendant and discussed the trend in the law
which made a verdict for the plaintiff possible. 7 The court stated
that the emphasis in the law is now on "unfairness" rather than
competition.7 2 Direct competition is no longer necessary; it is enough
if the unfair practices of one party will injure the other party.7 3
The name, American College of Trial Lawyers, was held to
have acquired a secondary meaning," giving the name a special
significance in the community, especially to the narrow segment that
comprised the profession involved.76 The court stated that it is not
the word "college" which is distinctive but the entire name. 78 The
70 CAL. CORP. CODE § 21000 (West 1955) states: "A nonprofit association is an
unincorporated association of natural persons for religious, scientific, social, literary,
educational, recreational, benevolent, or other purpose not that of pecuniary profit."
71 In Ball v. American Trial Lawyers Ass'n., 14 Cal. App. 3d 289, 301, 92
Cal.
Rptr. 228, 236 (1971), the court said: "While this case appears to be the first instance
in which this particular facet of the 'doctrine of unfair competition' is invoked as the
basis of relief in a dispute between two nonprofit organizations of the kind here involved, we think . . .it should . . .be applied."
72 Id. at 303, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 237. See also Wood v. Peffer, 55 Cal. App.
2d 116,
122, 130 P.2d 220, 224 (1942), "[Ilt has been held that there must be actual competition before there can be any unfair competition, and that there cannot be competition
unless there is something to compete with. However, the tendency of the courts has
been to widen the scope of protection in the field of unfair competition. They have
held that there is no fetish in the word 'competition,' and that the invocation of
equity rests more vitally on the element of unfairness." Accord, Sunset Housing Distr.
Corp. v. Coffee Dans, Inc., 240 Cal. App. 2d 748, 50 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1966).
73 Ball v. American Trial Lawyers Association, 14 Cal. App. 3d at 305, 92 Cal.
Rptr. at 238. See also Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences v. Benson, 15
Cal. 2d 685, 104 P.2d 650 (1940), where the court found "that direct competition is
not necessary" and granted an injunction. Plaintiff gave Oscar awards, and the
defendant school, "The Hollywood Motion Picture Academy," trained hopeful actors.
The parties were not directly competitive, but the injunction was granted because
defendant's use of the name would deceive the public.
74 See note 42 supra.
75 Ball v. American Trial Lawyers Association, 14 Cal. App. 3d 289, 302, 92
Cal. Rptr. 228, 236 (1971). The court found the legal community acceptable for the
test of secondary meaning but said, "(W]e feel that the relevant public includes that
cross-section of the populace who may come into contact with the names or the respective reputations of either organization, the activities of either organization or of
its respective members, or the official positions or views of either organization upon
contemporary controversial legal problems." Id. at 308, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 241.
76 Id. at 307, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 240. "It is the impression which the tradename as a
whole creates on the average reasonably prudent member of the relevant public and
not the parts thereof which is important." Id. at 307, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 240. See also
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test of possibility of confusion is whether the average member of
the public who may come into contact with either association would
be confused; the use of the name, American Trial Lawyers Association, by defendant made confusion likely." The result of such conwas of primary concern to
fusion, injury to reputation or goodwill,
7
1
decision.
its
reaching
in
the court
The Ball case illustrates the courts' desire to emphasize fairness. 79 The trade name problem in Ball is analagous to that of liter-0
ary titles discussed in Johnston v. 20th Century-Fox Film Corp.
In Johnston, the court held that the title, Queen of the Flat Tops,
had acquired a secondary meaning."' Similarly, in Ball the court
found that plaintiff's name, American College of Trial Lawyers,
had acquired a secondary meaning which qualified for trade name
protection. A literary title which has a secondary meaning should
less
receive protection. Furthermore, a title that meets a somewhat
82
should
familiarity,
public
of
test
demanding standard, e.g., the
also be protected. Unfair appropriation of literary titles should
not be tolerated.
CONCLUSION

The emphasis in unfair competition law in the last few years
has been on unfairness as illustrated in the case of Ball v. American
Trial Lawyers Association.' Inequities in business should not be
countenanced by the courts, especially where someone appropriates
the product of another. Federal copyright and patent laws which
give limited monopoly protection recognize the public need for access
American Automobile Ass'n. v. American Automobile Owners' Ass'n., 216 Cal. 125, 13
P.2d 707 (1932).
77 14 Cal. App. 3d 289, 308, 92 Cal. Rptr. 228, 241. See also Stork Restaurant v.
Sahati, 166 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1948); Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences
v. Benson, 15 Cal. 2d 685, 140 P.2d 690 (1940).
78 14 Cal. App. 3d 289, 305, 92 Cal. Rptr. 228, 238. Accord Yale Electric Corp.
v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928).
71 See Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences v. Benson, 15 Cal. 2d 685,
104 P.2d 650 (1940), where the court said: "[W]ithout regard as to whether there is
actual market competition between the parties for the same trade, it is sufficient if
the unfair practices of the one will injure the other." Id. at 689, 104 P.2d at 652.
80 82 Cal. App. 2d 796, 187 P.2d 474 (1947).
1884),
81 Id. at 813, 187 P.2d 474. Accord Estes v. Williams, 21 F. 189 (S.D.N.Y.
where the title of a book for children, "Chatterbox," was held to have acquired a
secondary meaning and the author given the exclusive right to place his work upon
the market. This was not a right to prevent copying but a right to be free from misrepresentations that another work was plaintiff's when put upon the market. This
right allows the author the fair enjoyment of the reputation of his work, which fully
belongs to him. "It deprives others of nothing that belongs to them." Id. at 190.
82 See text accompanying notes 65-66, supra.
s 92 Cal. Rptr. 228, 14 Cal. App. 3d 289 (1971).
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to certain products and ideas.84 But in cases of unfair appropriation
free competition is not present-the pirate is rewarded not the
creator; any argument that relief against such piracy perpetuates a
monopoly is myopic and unsound.
In Tomlin v. Walt Disney Productions,5 the court dealt with
the problem of appropriation of literary titles; unfortunately the
court used very broad language to declare misappropriation an effete
doctrine. The misappropriation doctrine is an effective means of
relief, however, as illustrated in Grove Press, Inc. v. Collectors
Publication, Inc."6 and Tape Industries Association of America v.
Younger. Furthermore, to originators of a title associated with
the work it identifies a limited right to realize commercial value
should be given.
The misappropriation doctrine along with other theories of
protection such as palming off, deter unfair competition and should
be considered in title cases if appropriate. When basic unfairness
arises in business, the courts need a remedy to counteract an unhealthy business environment which encourages the unfair use of
another's saleable product. For fifty-three years the misappropriation doctrine has been a flexible and effective means of protecting
individuals from another person's use of their product for profit.
It should not be abandoned.
Thomas A. Devins, Jr.
84 An individual may secure exclusive rights for a limited time, 17 years
in the
case of a patent and a term of 28 years with a right of one renewal for
another 28
years in the case of a copyright. For general treatment of these areas see
OPPENHEim,
supra note 5, 201-29.
85 18 Cal. App. 3d 226, 96 Cal. Rptr. 118 (1971).
86 264 F. Supp. 603 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
87 316 F. Supp. 340 (C.D. Cal. 1970).

